DISCOURSE AND EMOTION IN SUSTAINING VIOLENT SOCIAL MOVEMENTS DURING MILITARY OCCUPATIONS: IRAQ, NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

Abstract:
Why do violent social movements rise or fail during military occupations? How are some leaders able to overcome the problem of collective action and sustain violent campaigns that require voluntary, risky actions, but others are not? Why are only some leaders effective in achieving political objectives through sustained collective violence? In Iraq (2003–11), how was Muqtada al-Sadr, leader of the Sadrist Trend, able to muster a violent militia and vast popular support and thereby become a potent political player? Why did the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq fail to maintain its influence, and why did Al Qaeda in Iraq gain and then lose the ability to mobilize violence in the same period? Similarly puzzling variations in the outcomes of violent collective action have been observed elsewhere. In Northern Ireland (1969–98), how did the Provisional Irish Republican Army outstrip the Official Irish Republican Army in sustaining collective violence? In the Palestinian territories (1987–2015), how did Hamas defeat its established rival Fatah and transform itself into a highly organized political and social movement with a capacity for lethal terrorism? I argue that favorable microstructural conditions and emotional appeals from credible leaders with legitimacy among domestic audiences are necessary and jointly sufficient to sustain violent collective action. It is the interaction of discursive psychological variables and microstructural conditions through emotional mechanisms that enables only some leaders to sustain what I term violent social movements, or VSMs. I develop a middle-range theory of VSMs, using the methods of case- and mechanism-oriented comparisons, within-case process-tracing, discourse analysis, and archival research, while also drawing on my fieldwork in Iraq, Israel, Northern Ireland, and the Palestinian territories.
Today, there is a growing feeling among Palestinians, Israelis and the international community that the two-state paradigm may no longer be viable. USIP's Ambassador Hesham Youssef examines the potential scenarios facing Israelis, Palestinians and the region as the stalemated conflict continues without progress toward two states. Where is the UN demand to an end to military occupation and the belated return of Iraq to the people of Iraq? Under initial occupation, the UN transferred some US$8 Billion to a Provisional Authority headed by an American. And this was not UN money. The world has witnessed in Iraq the most serious of international crimes: the crime of military aggression on a sovereign member state by US and UK forces. The world waits for the people of Iraq to be given an opportunity to make their own decisions and resolve their own differences as only they can hope to do without foreign occupation and interference. This volume relies on social movement research to challenge the exceptional character that has been often attributed to this conflict in the past. At the same time, it asks how research on the Troubles might inform future research on social movements beyond the Northern Ireland case. Beginning with the H-Blocks in Northern Ireland during 1976-1981, there are many experiences of long-term cellular isolation around the world. The most notable examples are supermax prisons and security housing units (SHUs) in the United States after 1984 (now holding over 100,000). Many of the people of Northern Ireland seemed ready to challenge the status quo of violence and sectarianism that had come to dominate everyday life. Why do violent social movements rise or fail during military occupations? How are some leaders able to overcome the problem of collective action and sustain violent campaigns that require voluntary, risky actions, but others are not? Why are only some leaders effective in achieving political objectives through sustained collective violence? In the Palestinian territories (1987–2015), how did Hamas defeat its established rival Fatah and transform itself into a highly organized political and social movement with a capacity for lethal terrorism? I argue that favorable microstructural conditions and emotional appeals from credible leaders with legitimacy among domestic audiences are necessary and jointly sufficient to sustain violent collective action.