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Few questions are considered as urgent as those related to our understanding of and response to terrorism. With the exception of threats from organizations such as the IRA and ETA, the developed world has been a relatively safe haven for quite some time. The past decade’s bombings of civilian targets in Europe and in the US, however, have revealed developed society’s vulnerability and radically altered its members’ perception of risk. Although suicide bombings and other acts of terror have been part of everyday life in many regions around the world, such attacks on Western targets have rendered combating terrorism a key priority. Even if an embarrassingly late response to a longstanding global problem, terrorism is a pressing and highly complex issue, warranting a multidimensional response.

The authors of this anthology do not aspire to offer an exhaustive analysis of terrorism or comprehensive solutions thereto. Rather, motivated by a confused debate on the subject, their main goal is to provide input that might support an improved understanding of the causes and motives behind terrorist behaviour and help us understand how terrorism should be addressed.

Starting from their own field of expertise, senior research fellow Robert Imre, University of Newcastle, professor of philosophy T. Brian Mooney, Singapore Management University (SMU) and Benjamin Clarke, senior lecturer at the University of Notre Dame provide their own analysis in each of the book’s four chapters.

The first chapter addresses classical questions of how to define terrorism, terrorism for whom and why? To a degree, what is regarded as terrorism depends on the positions and interests of those using the label. Imre, for example, illustrates this point by showing how several American presidents have described the Mujahedeen as heroic freedom fighters while resisting Soviet occupation in Afghanistan and as terrorists when opposing the “coalition of the willing” in Iraq. This chapter also focuses on the causes and motives behind terrorism and terrorist behaviour, investigating the relevance of aspects like poverty (relative and absolute), ethnicity, minority, self-government and oppression.

The second chapter focuses on the question of torture and whether it can be understood as a morally justifiable and/or effective response to terrorism. Imre argues
that while torture is an effective means of social control, deterring citizens from skateboarding on sidewalks and/or from expressing their opinion etc, it is inefficient when it comes to stifling terrorism. Moreover, the usefulness of information extracted by means of torture can be called into question and the danger exists that side-stepping international law and human rights by allowing for the torture of terrorists under certain conditions can lead to the use of torture for other purposes, such as standard criminal investigations. More to the point, Imre argues that violence feeds violence and that torture will only galvanize the positions of terrorists, solidifying terrorist groups, radicalizing radicals. Contrary to his fellow authors, and based on the writings of Thomas Aquinas, Mooney argues that torture, while an intrinsic evil and a tragedy, may be justifiable under certain extreme circumstances.

The third chapter discusses whether international terrorism is an inevitable consequence of globalization. It points out that the preconditions for terrorism have changed significantly with developments in information technology (IT) now exploited by terrorists to create and maintain transnational networks. IT facilitates the transfer of funding, logistics, proliferation of propaganda, recruitment and the planning of attacks. Discussing conflicting values in a globalized world, Mooney suggests a narrative approach as a way to illuminate fundamental disagreements between and within cultures and religious traditions. He states that most of our deeply held positions stem from habituation rather than from reasoned enquiry, and suggests story telling as a strategy to identify dimensions that “create” our beliefs in order to be able to overcome radical disagreements.

The fourth and final chapter seeks to address the elements necessary for an effective global response to terrorism. It evaluates possible strategies for responding to terrorism such as government policies, social engineering and just war. In this chapter, Clarke reminds us how easy it is to destroy the social fabric, emphasizing the need for states to comply with the rule of law and human rights, promote dialogue and democracy and address injustices that fuel radical Islam. While Imre and Clarke are of the opinion that the rule of law must prevail and that extra legal measures are endemic to democratic values and counterproductive to long term stability, Mooney warns that a strict reliance on already established legislation and the right procedure may serve to diminish individual responsibility.

Given the book’s rather vague goal – to provide a better understanding of a complex phenomenon such as terrorism by means of a series of “contemplations” – the authors of this anthology cannot be criticized for failing to deliver accordingly. Highly relevant questions are addressed and ideas on how to respond to terrorism in sustainable ways are offered. What might be questioned, however, are the aspects an anthology responding to terrorism should preferably address, given the plethora of books dealing with the same topic. Undoubtedly, the legal perspective on terrorism is of central importance and Clarke provides an excellent overview of the legal framework relevant to an adequate response, showing how the international community can and should outlaw terrorism. As with many other discussions on terrorism, however, this anthology lacks the psychological perspective necessary for a deeper understanding of terrorists and terrorist behaviour. Furthermore, and despite the authors’ insistence that terrorism is not a “Middle
Eastern” or “Islamic” problem, they primarily focus on acts of terror emanating from radical Islam. Given this particular focus and in light of a general underrepresentation of non-Western Muslim perspectives on terrorism, such views would have been most illuminating and could have been accommodated by means of the narrative approach suggested by Mooney.

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Mahesh Ananth’s *In Defense of an Evolutionary Concept of Health* is based on his PhD dissertation. Taking Christopher Boorse’s concept of health and its critics as his starting point and major thread, he successfully develops his own evolutionary concept of health, which is basically an adaptation of Boorse’s.

Ananth sets the stage by introducing two different approaches to the concept of health. Some see health and disease as value-free concepts and as somatic conditions and adopt a naturalistic viewpoint. Others, however, are of the opinion that values and social concerns are indispensable components of the concept of health and are more inclined to adopt a normative viewpoint. Boorse himself maintains a function-based naturalistic view. The author describes Boorse’s critique of different naturalistic and normative concepts: he rejects statistical, homeostatic and evolutionary concepts as well as strong and weak normative views. Ananth agrees with many of Boorse’s critiques, but thinks that his critique of the evolutionary concept of health is too gene-centered.

The author discusses Larry Wright’s concept of function and Boorse’s reply, suggesting an approach that combines the strengths of both and leaves out their limitations. He then offers the reader a thorough overview of Boorse’s concept of health, which pictures health and disease in relation to the biological functions of parts of an organism. Ananth discusses some of Boorse’s critics and suggests that Boorse has successfully addressed their objections, except that of ‘bad biology’. Ananth claims that Boorse’s views about natural selection are inconsistent. Following this critique, the author sketches his own view on health, which is one of organism homeostasis and intercellular homeostasis, with adaptive functions justified by way of natural selection. Such an approach, according to the author, takes gender and age differences into account when contemplating health versus disease. Ananth applies his theory in five case studies: tuberculosis, allergies, down, sickle-cell anemia and osteoporosis. He finishes his book with a discussion on the unit of selection, rejecting both genes as well those who uphold the individual as the main unit of selection.

*In Defense of an Evolutionary Concept of Health* is a detailed philosophical exploration of one specific topic and to a major extent of one philosopher: Christopher Boorse. Boorse’s ideas and their critics are elaborated and sometimes countered with illustrative
examples from different fields (dentistry, evolution, allergies). Ananth’s style is meticulous, sometimes even tedious, and some degree of concentration is needed to read his book through to the end. The last chapter, in which he develops his own evolutionary concept of health, is original and clear, especially if one is ready to accept the premises of a norm-free concept of health. The volume’s discussion of the unit of selection is good as an introduction, but falls short on detailed argumentation. As a whole, however, this book offers a good overview for those interested in a theoretical reflection on the concept of health.

Kristien Hens
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Grant Gillett’s *Human Identity and Neuroethics* is an account of human identity based on a narrative concept of the human subject. Taking this narrative concept as his point of departure, Gillett tries to grasp what is persistent about human identity. He illustrates his way of thinking with a myriad of examples from stem cell research, conceptions of memory, neurological conditions such as split brain syndrome, locked in syndrome and schizophrenia, thought experiments with human embryos, etc. Throughout the book, he uses and quotes philosophers and thinkers from many different traditions, including Aristotle, Nietzsche, Lacan, Levinas, and Sartre.

Gillett sets about illustrating his theory by evoking some issues surrounding stem cell research and embryos. In this preliminary chapter, he points out that there is a fundamental difference between using embryos for stem cell research and for reproductive purposes. The difference lies in the latter – the embryo – being ‘in the process of becoming’, an attribute that is central to his way of thinking about identity. In the chapters that follow, he further develops this idea of human beings as having a certain form and developmental trajectory, as being holistic and longitudinally extended. Human beings, according to Gillett, are works in progress, are dependent on a narrative context. They are formed by participating in discourse and by taking part in a moral world together with other subjects. In this way, becoming a cognitive subject goes hand in hand with becoming a moral subject. Gillett explicitly rejects both the Cartesian view that separates mind and body and sees the subject as noting more than a mental entity as well as the reductionist view that we are merely a collection of neurological functions. This viewpoint gives him a framework to tackle ethical issues surrounding Persistent Vegetative State, for example, or the treatment of schizophrenia, Alzheimer’s disease, cyborgs and much more.

Gillett’s narrative concept of the subject is interesting and useful. It is also courageous to evoke ‘poststructuralist’ thinkers such as Lacan and Foucault in a climate in which reductionist views of the mind and the brain are omnipresent. This is one of the reasons why this book is worth reading. A second reason relates to the many clearly elaborated
thought experiments and examples Gillett uses to illustrate his point. *Subjectivity and Being Somebody* is not, however, an easy read. Although fresh and even comical in some sections, the author’s style is often obscure and fragmented. He uses so many philosophers from totally different traditions that it is easy to lose track of the argument. In addition, those who follow the book’s title and are looking for an overview of issues related to neuro-ethics will be disappointed: this is first and foremost a work of philosophy rather than applied ethics. The first chapter of the book, which is intended as an overview of the ground to be covered is not very inviting. In the last analysis, however, those who persevere and read on will not be disappointed: the book contains an overwhelming amount of interesting ideas, making it well worth the effort needed to finish it.

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What are the historical and theoretical origins of the modern state and our modern idea of constitutionalism? Confronted with this question, many philosophers will immediately refer to important politico-juridical developments that took place in the 16th and 17th century – like the peace treaties of Osnabruck and Münster – and the works of (early) modern thinkers like Jean Bodin, Thomas Hobbes, or John Locke. They would not be likely, however, to mention developments in the 14th, 13th or maybe even 12th century, or point to the works of medieval political and legal theorists.

Many academics agree, nevertheless, that this historical narrative reveals a gross oversimplification. They argue that the historical and theoretical origins of the modern state and constitutionalism can be located in the centuries preceding the peace of Westphalia and in the writings of some medieval theorists. Take for example Strayer’s *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State* (Princeton University Press, 1970), Tierney’s *Religion, Law and the Growth of Constitutional Thought, 1150-1650* (Cambridge University Press, 1982), or more recently some of the work of Hauke Brunkhorst.

Alexander Rosenthal’s *Crown under Law* should be understood against this background. His main goal is to present Richard Hooker – the English theologian and political theorist – as a mediator between the medieval and modern tradition of political thought, and to argue that we need a more complex understanding of the relationship between both. One simply cannot – as Leo Strauss, for example, does – work with a stringent divide. The ascent of constitutionalism, according to Rosenthal, can be seen as “emerging [not] from a radical effort to overthrow the traditional order of thought and society, but as an effort to preserve elements of this order from the novel claims made on behalf of modern state power in the person of the king” (246).

Rosenthal explicitly shares the Cambridge School’s emphasis on intellectual history and the history of political philosophy. His book should, therefore, be primarily seen as
an effort to contribute to such a history. This translates not only into an extensive sketch of Hooker’s place in Stuart and Restoration England and of the historical context of Locke’s work, but also into several short excursuses on historical settings and the history of concepts – such as a discussion of the doctrine of predestination in Christian theology or an elaboration of the controversy between Calvinists and Anglicans on the theology of the Church.

In the first part of the book, Rosenthal examines the historical context in which Hooker wrote – Elizabethan England – and explains Hooker’s place within our tradition of political philosophy. He meticulously demonstrates that Hooker should not only be seen as an important figure in the influential tradition of English political thought, but that he also succeeded in mediating between medieval and modern political philosophy; or, to be more precise, between the Aristotelian/Thomistic framework of political thought and early modern English political discourse.

In the second part of the book, Rosenthal examines Hooker’s historical and philosophical importance for seventeenth century English political thought, discusses Locke’s Whig interpretation of Hooker, and explains how Hooker’s political philosophy informed Locke’s constitutionalism. Rosenthal ends by elaborating the continued relevance of Hooker’s work for our contemporary debates in political philosophy.

Two appendices are attached to the final conclusion of the book. In the first, Rosenthal extensively discusses and rejects Strauss’ reading of John Locke as a radical modernist. In the second, he explains the main lines of the debate between Lockean scholars on the precise nature of his theory of natural law.

Although these chapters and appendices give an interesting and comprehensive account of Hooker’s relevance for the rise of modern constitutional thought, the book sometimes lacks analytical clarity. Rosenthal focuses too much on occasion on the detailed elaboration of the historical context and intellectual legacy of Richard Hooker. The attachment of two appendices nicely illustrates this point. This does not alter the fact, however, that Rosenthal’s arguments are carefully reasoned and rich in content.

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In *The Origin of Humanness in the Biology of Love*, Humberto Maturana Romesin sets out to define the essence of humanness and to explain how *Homo sapiens* came to exist as distinct from other primates. In the first half of the book, he explains that his idea of evolution is a systemic one. Rather than being the result of fortunate genetic transformations, species are a result of a history of systemic conservation of a manner of living. Human beings in particular are the result of “a primate evolutionary history in the conservation of a manner of living that entails sexuality, sensuality and tenderness, entwined
in the daily living in the biologies of love and intimacy” (140). He thus disagrees with the approach that takes the culture of chimpanzees, which is based on aggression and dominion, as a blueprint for our own evolutionary road. According to Maturana, we are truly a *Homo sapiens amans*. The phrase *The Biology of Love* is used in the second half of the book semi-religiously. Besides being an explanatory framework, Maturana also uses the concept as a guiding principle on how to proceed with humankind: rather than continuing the route of aggression, which Western society has followed for the last few thousands of years, we should go back to living in a primordial relation of love and trust, which is a matriarchic society. Only if we do so can we truly live according to our own human nature.

*The Origin of Humanness in the Biology of Love* is a bizarre book from the outset. Its extremely long foreword resembles a eulogy and is followed by a *General Reflection*, a *Prologue* and a chapter entitled *Fundaments*. At the end of the book, we find ten long appendices elaborating some of the ideas of the rest of the book and repeating others, an approach that I thought was not altogether successful. Some parts of the book are easy to follow, but the more epistemological chapters and appendices are very difficult and sometimes even obscure. Both Maturana’s explanation of the origin of humanness through love and his view that our humanness has become somewhat twisted over the last thousand decades can be interpreted as mere just-so stories. Indeed, there are few references to other scientific findings that might support this hypothesis. As a matter of fact, the book contains very few references at all, beyond those referring to Maturana’s own publications. The book would have benefitted from referring to recent studies in primatology, specifically with regard to bonobos. In this respect, the author’s claim that this is basically a work of science has to be taken with a grain of salt. His transition from what we are to how we should live would make many ethicists frown. And yet, some of the ideas he describes are refreshing and innovative, and I must say I enjoyed reading this book. Many great ideas that have changed the way we look at things have arisen out of the blue, and were often considered at first to be nothing more than scientific ranting and raving. I shall leave it up to the reader to decide whether this book is just that or full of great ideas.

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This Festschrift has been compiled and published in honour of Gerhold Becker, a distinguished figure in Applied Ethics. Becker founded the Hong Kong Centre for Applied Ethics and built up a strong international reputation in the areas of ethics and personhood, theology and religion, philosophy and philology, and philosophical links between East and West. In short, Becker has show himself to be a formidable bridge builder between practice, academic disciplines, and cultures.
Like most volumes of this kind, the present example is something of a curate’s egg. The title follows the Weberian distinction between responsibility and commitment and has several chapters that focus on these themes. Rudolph Post offers a very useful lexical history of the terms, one that reminds us that any understanding of them has to be argued not taken as a historical given.

The theme of responsibility gets off to an interesting start with Elisabeth Telfer reflecting on the responsible use of humour. It is a thoughtful piece, but it does not really focus on what responsible humour might be, other than avoiding the reinforcement of negative stereotypes. Telfer suggests that it might be impossible for this to happen in television sitcoms, partly because we tend to identify with the main figures. Hence Alf Garnett, the working class bigot of *Till Death Us Do Part*, can elicit more sympathy than the intended disapproval. Other examples, such as the recent Canadian Muslim sitcom, *The Little Mosque on the Prairie*, however, demonstrate a strong sense of responsibility, precisely through enabling viewers to look more closely at the dynamics of moral and cultural debate. The chapter would have benefited from a more detailed look at what Telfer meant by responsibility. Maureen Sie begins to do this in an interesting chapter reviewing behavioural, cognitive and neuroscientific research, suggesting that because of a lack of agentic transparency it is difficult to see how anyone can be truly aware of what drives them. Hence, the idea of the responsible agent is lost. Sie gives a solid rejoinder to this. Far from exempting us from bearing responsibility, this research demands that we should attend more clearly to these complexities. Intriguingly, Sie suggests that this demands more attention to the interpersonal aspects of responsibility. It is not far from this to the idea of transpersonal work, and from that to the idea that spirituality, involving the constant development of awareness and responsiveness, is central to the idea of responsibility.

Michael Sievernich takes responsibility from immutability to liability and a consideration of responsibility and globalization. He reviews the work of Weber and Jonas, and pleads for greater intentionality in responsibility. He echoes the call for religion to take a larger part in this debate.

Kajorpat Tangyin takes responsibility into the deeper waters of Levinas, stressing responsibility as focused in the other. Hence, responsibility is asymmetrical, expecting nothing from the other in return. The idea that this transcends egoism chimes with a lot of Islamic views of responsibility.

After these interesting chapters, Peter Momose’s and Stephan Rothin’s chapters are lightweight, and perhaps more importantly do not take a critical argument forward. Momose looks at the responsibility of the Christian Faith in relation to plurality in the Asian context. Taking his lead from Rahner, Momose suggests that Christian concepts such as revelation and incarnation have universal roots. It is not always clear how far this takes us beyond a responsibility to articulate ideas, many of which are claimed to have universal roots by several religions.

Rothlin’s chapter is a disappointment. It does give an interesting view of what an ‘Oriental’ university might be, but does not do what it says in the title, i.e. reflect on training students in social responsibility and commitment. Any debate about responsibility
inevitably leads us to the domain of education. It is hard to see how this can be done without some sense of what responsibility means and how this might be addressed in the curriculum, beyond simply talking about responsibility. This raises important questions about the relationship between responsibility and the learning experience that are simply not touched on.

The rest of the book is similarly variable, with excellent chapters from Georges Enderle (on the Golden Rule in a global context), Reiner Wimmer (on interreligious peace), and Kwok-ying Lau (on Derrida’s hermeneutics of friendship and its political implications).

This then is an interesting but patchy book, which effectively develops some of the debates around the issues of responsibility and commitment and touches on interfaith and inter-cultural relations and ethics. Perhaps, most of all, it reminds us that some of the really interesting developments in the debate emerge from extending it across cultures, and this is a valid recognition of Becker’s work in this area. As a book, however, it might have paid Becker more effective homage had it focused on a more closely argued dialogue around the title.

I would add two things. First, the claim that religion has much to add to debates on ethics and responsibility needs to be tested in wider debate with philosophers and practitioners. Second, there is an increasing conversation with Muslim scholars around universal responsibility, and little of this is reflected in the book.

Simon Robinson
Leeds Met University


This is a very competent book that succeeds in its aim to introduce different sociological approaches to risk. It is important not to expect too much, however, which is something that can be said of sociological theories as a whole. It is interesting to know about Douglas’s social constructionist theory of risk. Our identification of risk depends upon a whole set of cultural and moral values and social perspectives – one person’s risk is another’s everyday experience. Beck invites us to see more of the ‘reality’ of the risk that we face from the environment or new technologies. He suggests that any social constructivist approaches have to relate to these realities. Other theories look at how societies and governments seek to control risk, and Arnoldi lays his sociological cards on the table at the end of the book by suggesting that governments are focusing increasingly on the responsibility of the individual and moving away from taking responsibility for risk to the person.

Arnoldi begins by focusing on different areas of risk, from risk created by technology, the relationship of risk to science and to cultures, and the development of a risk culture in the leisure and finance industries. These are very useful reflections on developments across society, but, as always, it is difficult to draw convincing conclusions about late modernity being more of a ‘risk society’ than any other. The conclusions that
Arnoldi attempts to draw are that we are a society that is more aware of uncertainty and risk, and at the same time a society that calculates risk and tries to manage it as never before. It hardly surprising, however, that an awareness of risk leads to attempts to manage that risk better. In turn, this leads to questions that Arnoldi does not begin to follow. Is there really evidence of increased awareness of risk, or is it that ‘late modernity’ finds it hard to accept the idea of risk? Or is the increased concern with engaging risk to do with an increased awareness of responsibility? In previous eras, it could be argued that risks were even more directly apparent, but either they were accepted, often through elaborate ritual, as part of a culture that was more accepting of death, or there was simply no sense of responsibility. It took a long time, for instance, for the responsibility for public health to be included as part of social and healthcare policy.

Once sociology moves away from the development of theory to the description of what is happening, however confident it may sound, it moves into enormous generalisations, and I am not convinced that it can carry the weight of those set out by Arnoldi. The author’s certitude about the increased individualisation of responsibility may be down to the fact that he is Dean and Director of Research at Aarhus School of Business, and is thus confronted with a greater individualisation of responsibility in the business world. But even in this domain, it is not clear that there is a simple move towards individualisation. In the context of a global economy, Anglo American, for instance, has accepted responsibility, together with local communities and host nations, for developing community responses to and education around HIV Aids (Anglo American Report to Society 2005). Initially, the self-interest of the corporation led it to be responsible for this risk to employees. This then developed into a shared responsibility for wider education. Similar stories can be told by many different organisations. All of these point to an increased sense of shared responsibility and the importance of developing the means to negotiate responsibilities. Other evidence in the field of health and safety, for example, points to increased legislation that focuses on corporate responsibility for risk. The expansion of health and safety to well-being addresses the risk of stress in the workplace and the responsibility of the corporation to develop a culture that can handle more refined definitions of risk. In the wider field of healthcare, there is an increased stress on patient autonomy, and with that an increased concern to specify the risk of any medical procedure. In the area of alcohol addiction, for example, this even focuses on the responsibility of the addict to stop drinking before any medical procedure, such as a liver transplant, can be performed. Such examples are still in the context of shared responsibility for health, however, and they suggest that what is being seen is an increased stress on the negotiation of responsibility, not simply the individuation of responsibility.

As I suggested at the beginning of this review, this book does what it says on the label, taking us through sociology and risk. It recognises that this involves inter-disciplinary work, but ultimately the issues raised suggest the need for much more work, particularly with regard to the relationship between risk and responsibility. At this point ethics should take up the baton.

Simon Robinson
Leeds Met University
While the volume under review leaves the impression of being a collection of papers delivered at a conference, unlike most such volumes the standard of the various chapters is consistently high, and there is little deviation from one side of the debate – that stem cell research is ethically acceptable. Hence, the book should be recommended reading for all who have their doubts about such activity.

The chapter by Katrien Devolder and John Harris is in many respects the cornerstone of the volume, with other chapters developing their themes. They explore the arguments that characterise the embryo as having special moral status and conclude that the embryo is ontologically ambiguous, such that it is hard to support claims about its rights or interests. They point out that if embryos did have such a moral status then it would seem inconsistent not to give more attention to the loss of embryos in natural and assisted reproduction. Devolder and Harris conclude that given the absence of strong arguments against stem cell research and the fact that current practice does not support moral status of the embryo, it would be misguided to go for a compromise position. Diverse opinions can be respected, but opinion that is not based in rational argument cannot be used as the basis for legislation in this matter. The stress on rational argument is a strong card to play, especially as proponents of both sides tend to see their position as based in respect and concern for the embryo and the wider social context. It does raise major issues about moral and premoral goods expressed in religious doctrines rather than rational arguments, but the part that religion plays in this debate is not addressed at all. Tännsjö has some concern for the way we handle the issue of different moral perspectives, but ultimately argues that the values of a liberal democracy trump those of any moral rights group.

In all this, the book works impressively and convincingly through the various arguments related to stem cell research, but does not really begin to sort out the issues of what does not count as rational argument, and how religions can have a part to play in such a debate. This comes to a head in some respects with McMahan’s chapter. Intriguingly, he supports that view of Devolder and Harris, focusing in on the statement that we are not ‘human organisms’. What makes us human is not the biological ‘base-something’ that we share with the embryo, but rather our metaphysical base. Hence, we cannot simply identify ourselves with the embryo and assume that the end of an embryo is equivalent to the death of an adult human being. Like Devolder and Harris, McMahan wants us to connect to this understanding of humanity and to remain coherent in our practices with regard to embryos. The problem with the argument, however, is McMahan’s use of metaphysics. If our view of humanity is rooted in metaphysics (informed by biological facts), then it is not clear that this relates to rational arguments. One person’s metaphysics…. This focuses on core understandings of humanity, and again on defining appropriate respectful behaviour.

The rest of the book drills down deeper. Sagan and Singer take the debate about embryos to the cellular level and argue against moral status with thinking that parallels
Devolder and Harris. Harmen compares the embryo with the abortion debate, noting the major differences. Devolder and Ward look at the alternatives to this research. Again all these are informed by careful argument. The only surprising piece is by Gruen, who advocates that women should be able to sell their eggs for research, thus promoting options for women.

The book offers us many rational arguments, but leaves open a number of gaps that require more thoughtful engagement with the ‘other side’.

Simon Robinson
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The author examines how and why the constitutional idea arose in early modern England. He focuses on the major writings of John Locke and Richard Hooker and looks at their effect on each other's ideas. Rosenthal is a lecturer on political theory at John Hopkins University's Advanced Academic Programs in Government. Current Issue. Andrea Campbell's political journey; A conversation on racism and free speech; A fall like no other. Crown under Law is an account of how and why the constitutional idea arose in early modern England. The book focuses on two figures—Richard Hooker and John Locke. Rosenthal represents Hooker as a transitional figure who follows in the medieval natural law tradition even while laying the groundwork for Locke's political thought. The book challenges the influential interpretation of Locke by Leo Strauss (who saw Locke as a radical modernist) by illustrating the lines of continuity between Locke's argument in the Two Treatises of Government and the earlier political tradition represented by Hooker. By illustrating the often distinctive manner in which Hooker addressed the great questions, and how he powerfully affected later developments such as Locke's conception of the state, Rosenthal's Crown under Law establishes the important place of Richard Hooker in the history of political thought. With the death penalty and consequently all lesser penalties for regulating and preserving property, and to employ the force of the community in enforcing such laws and defending the commonwealth from external attack; all this being only for the public good. Chapter 2: The state of nature. 4. To understand political power correctly and derive it from its proper source, we must consider what state all men are naturally in. In this state men are perfectly free to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and themselves, in any way they like, without asking anyone's permission's Richard Hooker, John Locke, and the ascent of modern constitutionalism. Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2008 9780739124130 | Find, read and cite all the research you need on ResearchGate. With help of exlibris, signatures or other annotations you can identify the owner or owners of the book. The owner may make the book rare. Read more. Article. Book Reviews: The Modern Law of Employment By G. H. L. Fridman (Stevens, London, 1963), pp. clxii + 1